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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
49-3-103(7) Utah Code Annotated provides in part: 
(7) "Final Average Salarvff means the amount computed 
by averaging the highest three years of annual conden-
sation preceding retirement subject to Subsections (a), 
(b) and (c). 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the 
percentage increase in annual compensation in 
any one of the years used may not exceed the 
previous year's salary by more than 107o plus 
a cost-of-living adjustment equal to the decrease 
in the purchasing power of the dollar during the 
previous year, as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index prepare by the United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
(b) In cases where the employing unit provides 
acceptable documentation to the board, the limita-
tion in Subsection (a) may be exceeded if: 
(i) the member has transferred from another 
emnlovin? unit; 
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new 
position; or 
(iii) the vears used are not consecutive. 
(c) For purposes of computing the member's final 
average salary only, the member is considered 
to have been in service at his last salary rate 
from the date of the termination of employment to 
the date retirement becomes effective if the member 
so requests. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
THE CLAIM THAT SINCE THE PETITIONER BEGAN RECEIVING HIS 
OVERTIME THREE MONTHS BEFORE HIS PROMOTION, AND THEREFORE 
THE OVERTIME AND THE PROMOTION, ARE UNRELATED, IS AN 
UNMERITORIOUS CLAIM. 
At page 110, of the Record, is FINDING OF FACT No. 5, 
which reads as follows: 
#5. In July, 1993, three months prior to his 
promotion, and one year prior to his termination 
of employment Petitioner began receiving substantial 
overtime pay. 
Based on this FINDING OF FACT, the Respondent argues 
that there is no connection between the promotion and the 
overtime. 
On page 10 of Respondent's Brief is the following: 
M
. . . However, Allred cannot prove that the overtime 
was a direct result of the promotion since the 
overtime began to accrue three (3) months prior to 
the promotion ever being given.11 
Again on the same page of Respondent's Brief, they 
once again argue: 
"Allred received his promotion in September of 1993. 
In July 1993, three months prior to his promotion 
and one year prior to his termination, Allred 
began receiving substantial overtime pay." 
Petitioner submits that the claims by the respondent 
are without merit, as all that occured was that it took 
three months for the paperwork to catch up with the promotion. 
A careful review of page 106 of the Record will 
bear this out. 
According to the only evidence submitted on the 
issue, Mr. Allred was earning the sum of $15.07 until July 
17, 1993, and then with the promotion he began earning 
$16.56. He went from a J (Journeyman) L2 to a Range 23, 
Step 16, on the exact same day. 
He became the "Successful Applicant11 and the change 
was made as of July 17, 1993, however the Supervisor MK.W. 
Savage11 does not sign off on the paper work until July 30, 
1993, and the Agency Representative, MGene Sturgenegger" 
does not sign off on it until August 13, 1993. 
What is absolutely clear on the face of the document 
is that the State of Utah, retroactively made the change 
after the paperwork caught up with the promotion. 
This is why the exhibit at page 106, states 
ffRETR0M right on the document, was because the promotion 
and the pay and the overtime were all applied retroactively. 
It is true that the promotion was confirmed three 
months after the July 17, 1993, date, and so the FINDING 
OF FACT, is a correct statement of the facts. 
Therefore once the Dromotion was approved, Mr. 
Allred received a lump sum payment for his earned overtime 
going back to July, 1993. 
However, there is no evidence to support a claim 
that somehow the promotion and the overtime are unrelated. 
It is a clear statement of Appellate Law, that when 
one attempts to assail a FINDING, he/she must marshall all of 
the evidence that supports the said FINDING, and then show 
how the same was a clear abuse of discretion. 
In this care, it is critical to note that there is 
no evidence to support that claim bv the Respondentithat the 
promotion and the overtime are unrelated. 
Respondent merely made it up, and then attempted to 
show that since the overtime was paid retroactively to July 17, 
1993, somehow the overtime and the promotion are unrelated. 
It is all true that the promotion did not officially 
occur until all of the necessary individuals signed off 
on the promotion and the transfer, as this is perfectly 
clear on page 106, which was admitted into evidence, and 
is clearly part of the record. 
It is also perfectly clear that the overtime pay 
was paid to the Petitioner, retroactively back to July 17. 
1993, hence the FINDING OF FACT is a correct statement of 
the facts, however, it is not fair to merely say that since 
the promotion occurred in September, 1993, and the overtime 
was paid retroactively, that somehow the promotion and the overtime 
are unrelated. 
Petitioner submits that it is most interesting to note 
that the increase in pav from $15.07 to $16.56 per hour has 
the exact same beginning date as the overtime, and that is 
Julv 17, 1993, and it is therefore absurd to suggest that 
increased salary is fine when considering "Final Average 
Salary11 but somehow overtime is not, since supposedly the 
overtime is unrelated to the promotion. 
What is absolutely clear in this matter is the fact 
that the increased pay was approved retroactively, the 
increased overtime was approved retroactively and the promotion 
was approved Retroactively. 
There is no basis in law or fact, to suggest otherwise, 
and this is confirmed on page 105, of the Record, which states: 
While working under mv direction, Ronald H. Allred 
was in charge of all Region Two graffiti removal, 
Mechanical repair to all vehicles, landscaping and 
sprinkler svsterns. He was on - call for snow removal. 
During this time, he was required to vork overtime 
to accomplish the many demands of his position 
As no time does anyone in Region Two work overtime 
without justification. In every case of overtime 
usage, written justification was and is required. 
Again on page 104 of the Record, is the exact 
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same position confirmed: 
In the spring of 1993, Mr. Ron Allred applied 
for and was the successful applicant for the Station 
Supervisor of Station 245 of the Utah Department of 
Transportation. In July of 1993, Mr. Allred began his 
assignment for the above noted position. 
During that time, Station 245 was responsible for 
landscape throughout the District, for all the graffiti 
removal, and for the roving mechanics. 
The landscape responsibilities included part of the 
milti-million dollar landscape project recently completed on 
1-215, mowing all the State right of ways, and for the weed 
control and chemical spraying on the State right of ways. 
Mr. Allred was responsible to assure that all 
graffiti was removed from the State right of ways within 24 
hours. His office was the graffiti Mhot line" where all 
requests for graffiti removal were taken and then prioritized 
for removal. 
Because of Mr. Allred1s previous experience as a 
roving mechanic, he was assigned to supervise the roving 
mechanics in the District. 
These duties and all the other duties assigned 
to Mr. Allred during this period of time required that he 
work many hours of overtime. Mr. Allred followed the 
Department procedures of having his overtime approved. He 
did not work any more hours than what was required of him. 
As the Maintenance Engineer for District Two, I 
was very appreciative of the great amount of work that 
Mr. Allred accomplished, as he truly was an asset to 
the Department of Transportation. 
Again this is confirmed in the Record at pages 
101, 102 and 103. 
Bottomline, Respondent expects this Court to draw 
upon the confusion between the date the Promotion was approved 
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and the date it took effect, to support their claim that the 
promotion and the overtime, are unrelated, however, there 
is only a difference regarding the dates, and absolutley no 
confusion that wages, overtime and promotion were all applied 
retroactively, back to July 17, 1993, as expressly stated 
in the Record at page 106. 
Hence, the overtime was perfectly connected to the 
change of position, the increased pay and the transfer to 
the new region, and this was all without dispute before 
the Administrative Law Judge, as borne out in the record 
page 106. 
Hence, overtime must be included in the "Final 
Average Salary11 in determining the retirement of the 
Petitioner. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE CLAIM THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE 
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROMOTION AND OVERTIME IS WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
At page 10, the Respondent's Brief, they make 
the following statement: 
Throughout the evidence submitted with his reply 
brief, Allred apparently alleges that his overtime pay is 
a direct result of his promotion. However, the uncontroverted 
facts refute this position. 
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The first problem Petitioner has with this claim 
is that at the time that the Respondent is submitting it 
"Appellees Brief" there is no "Reply Brief" to consider 
or discuss. 
This writing is the "Reply Brief" and therefore 
the Respondent must be addressing some other matter. 
What is particularly troubling however, is 
the statement that the "uncontroverted facts refute the 
position" regarding the connection between the promotion 
and the overtime. 
In the Record at page 104, is the following: 
"In the Spring of 1993, Mr. Ron Allred applied 
for and was the successful applicant for the Station 
Supervisor of Station 245 of the Utah Department of 
Transporation, In July of 1993, Mr. Allred began his 
assignment for the above noted position. 
During that time, Station 245 was responsible for 
landscape throughout the District, for all the graffiti 
removal, and for the roving mechanics. 
The landscape responsibilities included part of 
the milti-million dollar landscape project recently 
completed on 1-215, mowing all the State right of ways, and 
for the weed control and chemical spraying on the State 
right of ways. 
Mr. Allred was responsible to assure that all graffiti 
was removed from the State right of ways within 24 hours. 
His office was the graffiti "hot line" where all requests 
for graffiti removal were taken and then prioritized for 
removal. 
Because of Mr. Allred1s previous experience as a 
roving mechanic, he was assigned to supervise the roving 
mechanics in the District. 
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These duties and all the other duties assigned to 
Mr. Allred during this period of time required that he work 
many hours of overtime. Mr. Allred followed the Department 
procedures of having his overtime approved. He did not 
work any more hours than what was required of him. 
As the Maintenance Engineer for District Two, I 
was very appreciative of the great amount of work that 
Mr. Allred accomplished, as he truly was an asset to the 
Department of Transportation. 
Again in the Record at page 105, is the following: 
While working under my direction, Ronald H. Allred 
was in charge of all Region Two graffiti removal, 
mechanical repair to all vehicles, landscaping and 
sprinkler systems. He was on-call for snow removal. 
During this time, he was required to work overtime 
to accomplish the many demands of his position. 
At no time does anyone in Region Two work overtime 
without justification. In every case of overtime 
usage, written justification was and is required. 
Petitioner submits that this evidence is uncontroverted, 
as no where before the lower Court or Hearing Officer has 
the Respondent ever claimed any problem with this evidence. 
More importantly however, it is absolutely clear 
that where is T!uncontrovert evidence" to suggest that 
the promotion and the overtime are unrelated. 
The Record bears out the connection between the 
overtime and the promotion, and there is no evidence to 
dispute or draw the same into question. 
Hence, the overtime must be included in the "Final 
Average Salary" of the Petitioner in determining his 
retirement. 
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ARGUMENT THREE 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO MEET HIS 
BURDEN OF PROOF WITHOUT MERIT. 
Petitioner submits that he did not have the burden 
of persuasion in the matter before the Administrative Law 
Judge, but rather the Respondent had the same. 
It is not the Petitioner that determines the 
MFinal Average Salary" but rather it is the Board, and 
therefore it is the Board that must justify its determination 
regarding what is to be considered and what is not to be 
included in that determination. 
A fair reading of the Statute suggests that the 
Petitioner has no burden whatsoever. 
Section 49-3-103(7)(b) states that the employing 
unit has a duty and the Board has a duty, but the Petitioner 
has no duty. 
Section 49-3-103(7)(b) states: 
(b) In cases where the employing unit provides 
acceptable documentation to the board, the 
limitation in Subsection (a) may be exceeded if 
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new 
position. 
It is clear that the employing unit must produce 
documentation to the Board regarding the promotion, and 
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then the Board has a duty to determine the "Final Average 
Salary11 including the promotion. 
Petitioner has no duty whatsoever to come forward 
with any evidence whether documentary or otherwise. 
In this case it is clear that the "employing 
unit" submitted undisputed evidence regarding the promotion 
and the relationship of the promotion to overtime. 
No one stood before the Administrative Law Judge 
and ever questioned the same, or raised any problem with 
the same. 
Now on appeal for the first time, Respondent 
argues that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of 
proof, when it was the Respondent that had the burden, 
once the "employing unit" submitted the documentation. 
Hence, the Petitioner is entitled to have his 
overtime considered as part of his "Final Average Salary" 
for purposes of determining his retirement. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
IF PETITIONER HAS A BURDEN OF PERSUASION BEFORE THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, THEN IN THIS CASE THAT BURDEN 
WAS MET WITHOUT CONTRADICTION. 
Petitioner submits that it was not his burden of 
persuasion before the Administrative Law Judge, as discussed 
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else where in this brief. 
However, even if it were his burden, he clearly 
met the same with the documentary evidence submitted to 
the Administrative Law Judge. 
As noted in the Record at pages 101, 102 and 103, 
Petitioner established by way of the Official Published 
Policy of his Department how overtime is treated. 
This evidence was not challenged by the Respondent 
in any way. No where in the record or the transcript did 
the Respondent address this dispositive evidence in any way. 
Hence, even assuming that the Petitioner needed 
to carry any burden, it is without question that this 
evidence was presented, and the same was never challenged 
in anyway before the Administrative Law Judge. 
On page 104 of the Record, the Petitioner established 
the specific relationship between his promotion and the 
overtime, and conclusively established the change regarding 
his duties, and the connection between the transfer from 
the roving mechanic to becoming the supervisor over all 
of the mechanics, etc. 
This evidence was never challenged in any way by 
the Respondent. 
On page 105 of the Record, the Petitioner established 
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by way of a document on the official letterhead for the 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, that Allred was required 
to work the overtime, when he took the promotion. 
This evidence was never challenged in any way 
by the Respondent. 
On page 106, Petitioner, using the very documentation 
provided by his "employing unit11, established the effective 
date for the promotion, the increase in salary, overtime, 
etc. and how the same was applied retroactively. 
This evidence was never challenged in any way 
by the Respondent. 
Bottomline, if the Petitioner had any burden 
whatsoever in this matter, it was clearly met by the 
"employing unit" submitting the unrefuted evidence that 
the promotion and the overtime were absolutely connected, 
and therefore the overtime must be included in the 
determination of the "Final Average Salary" for purposes 
of Allred1s retirement. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
THE CLAIM BY THE RESPONDENT THAT THE PETITIONER MADE NEW 
CLAIMS IN THE REBUTTAL IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT. 
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On page 8 of the Respondent's Brief they state 
to this Court, that somehow the Petitioner has raised 
new issues or new claims in his rebuttal. 
Frankly, Counsel is at a loss to determine where 
anything close to this claim ever occured. 
It is true that the Respondent made a claim, with 
no evidence, that the promotion and the overtime were unrelated, 
and that Petitioner conclusively established that such was not 
the case. 
However, there is no time where the parties are 
in a hearing, and the Petitioner is involved in any 
!frebuttalM format, as there was a brief hearing for the 
Respondent to justify their actions, and then there were 
Memoranda filed by each side. 
At no time was there any rebuttal of any nature 
whatsoever. 
Rather there was a total destruction of the unfounded 
claim by the Respondent's that there was no connection 
between the promotion and the overtime. 
Bottomline, there was no rebuttal, and there 
su^ rely were no new claims or issues raised by the 
Petitioner at anytime. 
The focus of this matter from the very beginning, 
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was why the Respondent refused to include overtime in 
the determination of the "Final Average Salary11 of the 
Petitioner. 
At the hearing, Petitioner questioned the only 
witness called to testify regarding this matter, and she 
stated that they did not do that because of some "actuarial 
soundness" doctrine. 
The focus of this matter therefore has never 
changed, except according to the record there is no basis 
to say that the promotion and the overtime are unrelated, 
as it is uncontroverted that they are all part of a new 
position, transfer, increased pay, new duties, much overtime, 
etc. 
Hence, overtime must be included in the "Final 
Average Salary" when determining the retirement of the 
Petitioner. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
THE CLAIM THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE TESTIFIED AS 
TO HIS OVERTIME DURING THE HEARING IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
At page 7 of the Respondent's Brief, they made 
a claim that the Petitioner should have testified at the 
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hearing that the overtime and the promotion were related. 
Petitioner submits that this claim, completely 
overlooks the clear and unequivocal mandate by the State 
Legislature, when deciding these issues: 
In 49-3-103(7), Final Average Salary is defined 
and a procedure for determining the same is established. 
Subsection "blf in the said section, begins with 
the following language: "In cases where the employing 
unit provides acceptable documentation to the board, the 
limitation in Subsection (a) may be exceeded if: (ii) the 
member has been promoted to a new position.11 emphasis added. 
In this case the State Legislature did not say that 
any kind of evidence would suffice to establish the 
connection between the Petitioner and the promotion, 
rather the State Legislature mandated that the evidence 
be by documentation. 
This is exactly what the Petitioner did, as he had 
his employer put on official UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSFORATION 
letterhead at page 104 of the record and again at page 105 
of the record, the exact documentation referenced by the 
State Legislature. 
What is abundantly clear in this matter, is that at 
no time either before the lower tribunal nor on appeal, 
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does the Respondent claim that the "documentation11 of the 
"employing unit" is bogus, unreliable or even somehow 
inconclusive. 
Respondent produced no evidence whatsoever, 
regarding the overtime and the promotion, and now has 
no basis on appeal to make the claim of the alleged 
connection. 
As noted on page 106 of the record, the Petitioner 
submitted into evidence the exact printout by his 
employer, showing expressly the promotion and the 
effective date, the retroactive application of the same, 
along with the approval of the same by K.W. Savage, the 
Supervisor, and Gene Sturgeneggar, the Agency Representative. 
Respondant produced nothing either to establish a 
lack of connection between the promotion and the overtime, 
nor did the Respondent ever submit any evidence whatsoever 
to contradict or even draw into question the conclusive 
evidence submitted by the Petitioner. 
Hence, it is not a well taken position to suggest 
that Petitioner disregard the clear mandate of the State 
Legislature, to have the "employing unit" submit 
"documentation" regarding the said promotion. 
There are clear and substantial policies in this 
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mandate by the State Legislature, as it is the "employing 
unitn that submits the documentation, not the applicant. 
There is too much at stake on both sides of an 
alleged promotion to suggest that the "applicant" can 
just "say" that it occurred. 
The State Legislature made it clear that the 
evidence must be by way of documentation and it must 
come from the employing unit. 
Petitioner did exactly as required by the State 
Legislature, and therefore he is clearly entitled to have 
his overtime considered as part of the "Final Average Salary". 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
THE CLAIM THAT THE PETITIONER SUBMITTED HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT HIS POSITION WITHOUT MERIT. 
The Respondent claims that the Petitioner only 
submitted hearsy evidence to support his claim that his 
overtime was linked to his proportion. 
At page 9 of the Respondent's Brief, he states: 
Moreover, the only evidence that has been presented 
that links the overtime to the promotion is hearsay 
evidence. While hearsay evidence is allowed in 
administrative proceedings (see Utah Code Ann. 
63-46b-8(c), Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-10(3) states 
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fno finding of fact that was contested may be 
based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence.f 
Allred has relied completely on hearsay evidence 
to met (sic) his burden of proof that the overtime 
was a direct result of the promotion. The letters 
submitted by Allred in his reply memorandum are 
out of court statements offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted and are clearly hearsay. 
(See Rule 801(c) Utah Rules of Evidence.) Under 
the Circumstances, the Administrative Law 
Judge was correct in not relying on that hearsay 
evidence in making his Finding of Fact. 
Respondent submits that this Court must look to the 
record and see, firsthand how this objection has no merit. 
At page 101 or the Record, is a document maintained 
in the normal course and scope of employment. This 
document is generated by the State of Utah, Department 
of Transportation, and was "Revised 01/05/90M. This 
document on its face has the following language, "EFFECTIVE 
DATE 7-1-77". 
This document is clearly an official publication, 
and clearly admissable evidence under Rule 902, of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Under subsection (5) 
Official publications are admissable because it is, 
"Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to 
be issued by public authority.M 
Bottomline, this document is not hearsay, but 
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is a document admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, 
because it is generated in the normal course and scope 
of the Department of Transportation, and is an official 
publication. 
The exhibit found at page 106 of the Record, 
is a document showing how the overtime was applied to 
the Petitioner. 
This document is generated by the State of Utah, 
in the normal course and scope of employment, and is 
clearly admissable evidence. 
As to the exhibits found at pages 104 and 105, 
these too are documents generated by the government, 
State of Utah, Department of Transportation and are 
admissable evidence under Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which states, "Hearsay is not admissable except 
as provided by law or by these rules." 
The very section in question before this Court 
of the Utah Code Annotated at 49-3-103(7)(b), which 
determines whether the overtime of the Petitioner is to be 
considered by the Board, is the following language. 
(b) In case where the employing unit provides 
acceptable documentation to the board, the 
limitation in Subsection (a) may be exceeded if: 
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new 
position; or 
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In the case at hand this is exactly what the 
"employing unit11 had done. 
Respondent wants this Court to decide that 
certain evidence submitted to the Board was somehow 
inadmissable, when in reality the evidence submitted, 
was exactly what the State Legislature mandated. 
The section calls for documentary evidence to 
be submitted, and to be submitted by the employing agency, 
and therefore the claims that the evidence was hearsay 
and therefore inadmissable is wholly without any merit 
whatsoever. 
Furthermore, as noted elsewhere in this Reply 
Brief, the Respondent had all of the opportunity in the 
world to respond to these documents and chose not to 
respond, and now claims for the first time on appeal 
that these somehow are inadmissable, when he made no 
objection to them before the lower Court or Board. 
Respondent in his brief makes a concerted effort 
to address the need to timely raise matters so that they 
can be resolved fairly and adequately, and wholly fails 
to timely object to documents which he now calls 
into question, and raises the same, untimely, and only 
on Appeal. 
-20-
However, the docments were received into evidence 
by the Board, they were exactly what was called for 
by the State Legislature, and they squarly were documents 
which were submitted by the "employing unit11, and 
established without any contravention that the overtime 
was part and parcel with Petitioner's promotion. 
Hence, the overtime pay associated with the 
promotion must be included in the determination of "Final 
Average Salary." 
ARGUMENT EIGHT 
THE CLAIM THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FOUND THE 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER TO BE INADMISSABLE 
HEARSAY IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT. 
On pages 7, 8 and 9 of the Respondent's Brief, 
Respondent suggests to this court that the Administrative 
Law Judge found the documentary evidence of the Petitioner 
to be inadmis sable hearsay and therefore he could overlook 
the same in his adjudication. 
This is totally fabricated by the Respondent. 
There is absolutely nowhere in the record or in 
the transcript where the Respondent called into question 
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the evidence in any way. No where in the record where 
the Administrative Law Judge was called upon to decide 
any hearsay question. 
Most importantly there is no where in the record 
where the Administrative Law Judge concluded that any of 
the evidence submitted by the Petitioner was inadmissable 
for any reason whatsoever. 
Respondent would wish that the Administrative Law 
Judge would have ruled that this conclusive evidence was 
somehow inadmissable. 
Respondent would wish that the Administrative Law 
Judge had made some determination regarding this 
dispositive evidence so that Respondent would not have to 
deal with it on appeal. 
However, Respondent never objected to any of it, 
and the lower Court made no determination regarding the 
same, and the Respondent is now raising the same for 
the first time on appeal. 
More seriously however, the Respondent is suggesting 
to this Court that the same was called into question by 
the Administrative Law Judge and that the said Judge 
had ruled in favor of the Respondent. 
A fair reading of all of the evidence, all of the 
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record and all of the transcript will show that Counsel 
made no objection and the evidence is clearly probative 
and Petitioner submits conclusive and dispositive. 
Hence, the Petitioner is entitled to have his 
overtime considered part of his "Final Average Salaryfr 
for purposes of determining his retirement. 
ARGUMENT NINE 
THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION THAT THE DOCUMENTATION SUBMITTED 
BY THE EMPLOYING UNIT OF MR. ALLRED WERE ACCEPTABLE 
DOCUMENTATION. 
Perhaps it goes without saying that since the 
documents wereinfact "accepted""by the Board, they were 
"acceptable11 documents. 
It is critical to note that the Statute requires 
that the documentation submitted by the employing unit 
be merely "acceptable11. 
Respondent argues that the evidence would not be 
allowed in a Court of Law, because the same was hearsay. 
However, "hearsay" is not a criteria in the 
determination of the acceptability of any documentary 
evidence from an employing unit. 
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It stands to reason that documents coming from "emDlovinp 
units" are by their very nature documents On the letterhead of the 
employinger; documents signed by one in authority, and documents 
specifically referencing the employee. 
With the exception of the official publication by the Utah 
Department of Transnortation. each such document met this criteria. 
At no time did the Respondent challenge any of these ^ documents 
as being unacceptable, or hearsay, but now raisp it for the first time-
Petitioner is entitled to have his overtime included in the 
determination of "Final Average Salary" regarding his retirement. 
ARGUMENT TEN 
THE CLAIM BY THE RESPONDENT THAT HE WAS SOMEHOW PRECLUDED 
FROM ADDRESSING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER 
IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
On page 8 of the Respondent's Brief, Counsel claims to have 
been prevented from responding to the evidence submitted by Petitioner. 
Petitioner submits that this claim is absurd, as noted on 
page 21 of the transcript, the Judge invited both parties to submit 
Memoranda. On page 23, the Judge allows Reply Memoranda, for the 
asking. 
Respondent did not ask for the opportunity, because he felt 
that it was unimportant, however, there is no basis to say that he 
was prevented from doing so. 
He could have filed a regular Reply Memorandum, or a Motion 
to Strike, if he felt that Petitioner's evidence was questionable, 
or any other Motion if he felt inclined. 
He surely could have moved the Court to not allow the critical 
evidence into the record, if he thought they were hearsay, or for what-
ever challenge he wanted to make. If Mr. Anderson throught that 
the documents were bogus, or a forgery, or otherwise unreliable he 
was free to do whatever he wanted. 
He did not care to do so, and surely was not prevented from 
doing so, and therefore this claim has no merit, and Petitioner is 
entitled to have his overtime considered as part of his "Final Average 
Salary'1 for purposes of determining his retirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner worked thirty (30) years expecting his retirement 
to be in place. Every pay peried he took home less each month so that 
he would have something there where he turned eligible for retirement. 
If he were paid everyother week, there would have been 
780 times he worked, upholding his part of the agreement, and expecting 
his retirement to be there, with the State taking his money each and 
everytime. 
Now after the same has vested, and he is locked into whatever 
they will pay, thev say, "We will not pay you for the overtime you 
worked because, we . have to do what is actuarily sound." 
This employee had bohh.a " t r ans fe r " and a "promotion", and 
therefore the l imi ta t ion does not apply, and therefore he i s e n t i t l e d 
under the Utah Code Annotated, to have his overtime included in 
the determination of "Final Average Sa la ry ." 
Petitioner respectfully requests that his overtime be included 
in the determination of "Final Average Salary." 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 1995. T^A " "\ 
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